Vojna tretjega sveta

[sadhu sequencer]

fauzo reče pred 1 uro:

toliko, da bi jih bolelo. to oceno je težko dati, ker ne vemo česa so sposobni. 

 

Kje bi jih bolelo, v riti?

11. november 2023 uredilo bitje sadhu sequencer

[fauzić]

nekdo reče pred 1 uro:

Zato se jih putin ogiba kot hudič križa.

Večino tega so že imeli, edin omembe vreden dosežek je povezava s krimom., dajansko pa ne nadzorujejo niti tistega, kar so na zamljevidih aneksirali. Pa še to potem, ko so uvideli, da od začetnega plana ne bo nič.

Putin se izogiba drafta? Hmm ... to mi je novo. Izvedli so nabor takoj, ko so ocenili, da imajo premalo vojske za obseg operacije. In, kljub drugačnim poročilom, je ta potekal relativno gladko. 

Kar se tiče ozemlja pa ja, dosegli so večino primarno začrtanih ciljev. In to za ceno mnogo nižjo od tega kar plačuje Ukrajina. 

 

Mislim, da je vredno vojno pogledati iz drugega horizonta. Ključno vprašanje je : kaj Rusija dejansko investira v vojno in kaj je izgubila.

 

In smo pri @sadhu sequencer vprašanju : kaj bi Rusijo bolelo? 

a.) gromozanske žrtve "višjega sloja" :

dokler vlečejo v vojno predvsem folk s kitajske meje ... tu se nam ponuja odlična vzporednica z novoveško vojsko : gre za ljudi, ki nimajo NIČESAR, za katere je vpoklic pravzaprav priložnost, da svojo družino rešijo iz bede (menda so plačani čez 4k dolarjev na mesec). Seveda pri tem tvegajo svoja življenja, ampak ...

Folk s kitajske meje nima nobenega vpliva na politiko, nihče (ki kaj velja) jih ne bo pogrešal. 

 

b.) ekonomski kolaps

do tega očitno ne bo prišlo, ker je vmes Rusija že normalizirala stanje

 

c.) politični kolaps

tudi ta je relativno neverjeten, oz. sam bi rekel, da manj verjeten kot v prvih mesecih vojne. Zakaj? Sedaj Putin lahko svojim "podložnikom" reče vidite, saj sem vam rekel, da nam zahod hoče slabo. Počasi vidimo preusmeritev gospodarstva v vojaško industrijo, ob tem pa se počasi budi tudi "ruski duh" (noben me ne bo jebal suka blyat) https://www.statista.com/statistics/896181/putin-approval-rating-russia/

 

Prehajamo v stanje 1984, kjer je "grožnja z zahoda" lahko uporabljena za karkoli v Rusiji. Za bolj striktno blokado medijev, za dodatne vpoklice, navsezadnje za razglasitev vojnega stanja in vojne industrije. Zdi se kot da so Rusi uspeli obrniti interpretacijo vojne v Rusiji v svojo prid. In to, ironično, na teh truplih, ki jih ti neprestano objavljaš. 

 

To je tragično. Ker to so mladi ljudje, kot jaz in ti, ki so bili nič hudega sluteč vpotegnjeni v vojno moči, ki se jih pravzaprav ne tiče. In ker so te smrti nepomembne, še več, Rusi jih lahko uporabijo za nadaljevanje kampanije ... so te smrti še toliko bolj tragične. 

 

na tej vojni resnično spet vidimo, da je humanizem izmišljotina. 

 

In ne samo, da je ta vojna nevarna za prihodnost te vojne, ampak nasploh za mir v Evropi. Verjemi, da se ne bo dobro končalo, če Putin uspe prepričati Ruse, da je zahod nevarnost in da je Kitajska rešiteljica. Čeprav za to je verjetno danes že prepozno. 

 

 

11. november 2023 uredilo bitje fauzo

[MikeHunt]

@sadhu sequencer velike besede za zensko, ki je pred dvema ruskima medvedjima mladicema skocila v ogrado ovac.

 

Odlicna metafora za efemizirano Evropo

 

 

LP

[sadhu sequencer]

MikeHunt reče pred 1 uro:

@sadhu sequencer velike besede za zensko, ki je pred dvema ruskima medvedjima mladicema skocila v ogrado ovac.

 

Odlicna metafora za efemizirano Evropo

 

 

LP

 

Nista bila ruska medveda temveč kolovijska medveda.

[sadhu sequencer]

Meanwhile.

 

Ruski raketni in dronski napadi danes niso zadeli ničesar, večje škode ni, nihče ni poškodovan.

[sadhu sequencer]

Ruska vojska je 10.11.2023 v okolici Avdijevke izgubila 65 tankov in 133 oklepnikov. Ukrajinska vojska je na ta dan pred Avdijevko izgubila 8 tankov in 4 oklepnike.

[fauzić]

sadhu sequencer reče pred 2 minutama:

Ruska vojska je 10.11.2023 v okolici Avdijevke izgubila 65 tankov in 133 oklepnikov. Ukrajinska vojska je na ta dan pred Avdijevko izgubila 8 tankov in 4 oklepnike.

dej ti vire za te neumnosti. 133 oklepnikov so peljali v ofenzivo, POTEM ko je že pol leta jasno, da okupirnaih območij ni mogoče osvajati z "armorjem"? 

tole se bere kot fantastika

12. november 2023 uredilo bitje fauzo

[sadhu sequencer]

fauzo reče Pravkar:

dej ti vire za te neumnosti. 

 

Viri za verodostojne podatke so podani zgoraj. Povej pa kje bo dobila vire Ruska Federacija po svojem porazu v Ukrajini.

[fauzić]

sadhu sequencer reče pred 2 minutama:

 

Viri za verodostojne podatke so podani zgoraj. Povej pa kje bo dobila vire Ruska Federacija po svojem porazu v Ukrajini.

kdo pa še govori o porazu v Ukrajini? Ti pa par forumskih trollov. Nisem videl že mesece članka Ukrajina zmaguje  

 

12. november 2023 uredilo bitje fauzo

[sadhu sequencer]

fauzo reče pred 6 minutami:

kdo pa še govori o porazu v Ukrajini? Ti pa par forumskih trollov. Nisem videl že mesece članka Ukrajina zmaguje  

 

Torej ni ti znano

[fauzić]

sadhu sequencer reče pred 2 urama:

 

Torej ni ti znano

Ne ni mi znano. In zdi se mi neverjetno škodljivo, da se ta agenda neprestano poriva naprej, čeprav je daleč od resnice. Na ta način se usmerja zahodna družba v norost. Lahko bi rekli, da smo zahodnjaki z vojno utrdili stolček Putinu. Kdo o tem piše?

[Aktivist Vanč]

https://n1info.si/novice/svet/nemska-pomoc-ukrajini-bo-prihodnje-leto-podvojena/

[sadhu sequencer]

fauzo reče pred 8 urami:

Ne ni mi znano. In zdi se mi neverjetno škodljivo, da se ta agenda neprestano poriva naprej, čeprav je daleč od resnice. Na ta način se usmerja zahodna družba v norost. Lahko bi rekli, da smo zahodnjaki z vojno utrdili stolček Putinu. Kdo o tem piše?

 

Glede na to da je Putin javno letos priznal, da Rusija ne more zmagati, se bolj zdi da Zahod kar owna zadevo.

[Darth_Maul]

Noben ne owna nič, ker se borijo kot v 1. svetovni vojni. Problem na obeh straneh bi naj bil, da zaredi satelitskih posnetkov in raketnih sistemov ne morejo skoncentrirati večjega števila vojakov, ker so takoj zbombardirani. Zato jim edino ostanejo na razpolago napadi z manjšim številom oklepnih vozil in vojakov. Rezultat tega je znan. Frontna linija se komaj kaj premika.

[Gogy]

Rusija zaradi bojevanja v Ukrajini pomilostila vpletenega v umor novinarke Politkovske - RTV SLO

 

 

[bainit]

Darth_Maul reče Dne, 13. 11. 2023 at 20:32:

Noben ne owna nič, ker se borijo kot v 1. svetovni vojni. Problem na obeh straneh bi naj bil, da zaredi satelitskih posnetkov in raketnih sistemov ne morejo skoncentrirati večjega števila vojakov, ker so takoj zbombardirani. Zato jim edino ostanejo na razpolago napadi z manjšim številom oklepnih vozil in vojakov. Rezultat tega je znan. Frontna linija se komaj kaj premika.

rusija ima bore malo satelitov, tut ti, ki jih imajo, nimajo neke hude resolucije. tut pri ukr baje velja, da nimajo realtime podatkov z ameriških vohunskih (majo pa free komercialne fotke), tko da imajo ti podatki preveliko latenco za taktično odločanje.

mislim da se oboji zanašajo bolj na drone + ukr na zahodni intel

[fauzić]

bainit reče pred 42 minutami:

rusija ima bore malo satelitov, tut ti, ki jih imajo, nimajo neke hude resolucije. tut pri ukr baje velja, da nimajo realtime podatkov z ameriških vohunskih (majo pa free komercialne fotke), tko da imajo ti podatki preveliko latenco za taktično odločanje.

mislim da se oboji zanašajo bolj na drone + ukr na zahodni intel

bore malo satelitov, a majo svoj gps sistem. 

[bainit]

manj natančen kot GPS. mislil sem optične vohunske satelite, baje so do 2015 uporabljali še film.

[sadhu sequencer]

Ruskega vojaka je v Chernihiv oblast ubila divja svinja.

[bainit]

zanimiv clip https://files.catbox.moe/wdf4xo.mp4

on je verjetno tudi izkušen vojak in se mu najbrž ne gre za zmago za fsako ceno, ampak za en kompromis, ki bo sprejemljiv zanje.

[Vanz]

sadhu sequencer reče Dne, 12. 11. 2023 at 21:06:

 

Glede na to da je Putin javno letos priznal, da Rusija ne more zmagati, se bolj zdi da Zahod kar owna zadevo.

 

Wall Street Journal: It’s Time to End Magical Thinking About Russia’s Defeat

 

Putin has withstood the West’s best efforts to reverse his invasion of Ukraine, and his hold on power is firm. The U.S. and its allies need a new strategy: containment.

 

https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/its-time-to-end-magical-thinking-about-russias-defeat-f6d0b8de?mod=wknd_pos1

 

 

Also, ne rata mi mimo paywalla z običajnim archive.ph, ima kdo delujoc način?

 

 

[bainit]

It’s Time to End Magical Thinking About Russia’s Defeat

Putin has withstood the West’s best efforts to reverse his invasion of Ukraine, and his hold on power is firm. The U.S. and its allies need a new strategy: containment.

 

As Russian President Vladimir Putin looks toward the second anniversary of his all-out assault on Ukraine, his self-confidence is hard to miss. A much-anticipated Ukrainian counter-offensive has not achieved the breakthrough that would give Kyiv a strong hand to negotiate. Tumult in the Middle East dominates the headlines, and bipartisan support for Ukraine in the U.S. has been upended by polarization and dysfunction in Congress, not to mention the pro-Putin leanings of Republican presidential front-runner Donald Trump.

Putin has reason to believe that time is on his side. At the front line, there are no indications that Russia is losing what has become a war of attrition. The Russian economy has been buffeted, but it is not in tatters. Putin’s hold on power was, paradoxically, strengthened following Yevgeny Prigozhin’s failed rebellion in June. Popular support for the war remains solid, and elite backing for Putin has not fractured.

Western officials’ promises of reinvigorating their own defense industries have collided with bureaucratic and supply-chain bottlenecks. Meanwhile, sanctions and export controls have impeded Putin’s war effort far less than expected. Russian defense factories are ramping up their output, and Soviet legacy factories are outperforming Western factories when it comes to much-needed items like artillery shells.

The technocrats responsible for running the Russian economy have proven themselves to be resilient, adaptable, and resourceful. Elevated oil prices, driven in part by close cooperation with Saudi Arabia, are refilling state coffers. Ukraine, by contrast, depends heavily on infusions of Western cash.

 

Putin can also look at his foreign-policy record with satisfaction. His investments in key relationships have paid off. China and India have provided an important backstop for the Russian economy by ramping up imports of Russian oil and other commodities. Instead of fretting about lost markets in Western Europe or Beijing’s reluctance to flout U.S. and EU sanctions, Putin has decided that it’s more advantageous in the short term simply to become China’s junior partner in the economic realm. Goods from China account for nearly 50% of Russian imports, and Russia’s top energy companies are now hooked on selling to China.

Even neighboring countries that have every reason to fear Putin’s aggressive tactics, such as Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, have made fat profits by serving as enablers of sanctions circumvention and as transshipment points for the goods that Russia used to import directly.

 

Despite Putin’s indictment by the International Criminal Court and abundant evidence of Russian state-sponsored war crimes in Ukraine, he is still embraced in various parts of the so-called “global South.” The Ukraine war holds little salience for many countries who bristle at what they perceive as U.S. and European double standards or a lack of engagement on issues that concern them.

None of this should come as a surprise. More than six months before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Putin signed off on a new National Security Strategy for Russia. The main thrust of that document was to prepare the country for a long-term confrontation with the West. Today Putin can tell the nation that his strategy is working.

Putin does not feel any pressure to end the war or worry about his ability to sustain it more or less indefinitely. As winter approaches, the Russian army has mounted a limited ground offensive of its own and surely will expand missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian cities, power plants, industrial sites and other critical infrastructure. At a minimum, Putin expects that U.S. and European support for Ukraine will dissipate, that Ukrainians will tire of the endless terror and destruction inflicted on them, and that a combination of the two will enable him to dictate the terms for a deal to end the war and claim victory. From his perspective, the ideal person to put such a deal together is Donald Trump, if he returns to the White House in January 2025.

 

The Russian leader is prepared to weaponize everything at his disposal to win the war in Ukraine. Nuclear arms control and European security are now hostage to Russia’s insistence on the West ending its support for Ukraine. What remains of the Cold War-era arms control framework will be completely gone in 2026, and there is a growing risk of an unpredictable three-way nuclear arms race among the U.S., Russia and China. Putin will use every global and regional issue—whether the Israel-Gaza war, food security or climate action—as leverage to win the war against Ukraine and the West.

 

Taken together, this state of affairs poses an unprecedented challenge for Western leaders. Washington and its allies have been remarkably effective at tackling the most urgent aspects of this problem: staving off Ukraine’s collapse, keeping it well-supplied with advanced weapons and real-time intelligence, and devising sanctions against Russia.

But now is the time to transition to a long-term strategy that increases and sustains the pressure on the rogue regime in the Kremlin. There should be no illusions that any possible combination of short-term steps will be sufficient to force Putin to abandon his war.

What Western leaders conspicuously haven’t done is level with their publics about the enduring nature of the threat from an emboldened, revisionist Russia. They have indulged all too often in magical thinking—betting on sanctions, a successful Ukrainian counter-offensive or the transfer of new types of weapons to force the Kremlin to come to the negotiating table. Or they have hoped to see Putin overthrown in a palace coup.

During the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy thinkers didn’t bet on a sudden change of heart by the Kremlin or the overnight collapse of the Soviet system. Instead, they put their faith in a long-term vision of resisting a dangerous regime and making the required investments in national defense and the military capabilities of our alliances—a policy, in George Kennan’s classic formulation, of “patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”

A policy of containment today would mean continuing Western sanctions, isolating Russia diplomatically, preventing the Kremlin from interfering in our own domestic politics, and strengthening NATO deterrence and defense capabilities, including sustained U.S.-European reinvestment in our defense-industrial base. It would also mean mitigating all of the damage—diplomatic, informational, military and economic—caused by Putin’s war.

 

That is not to say that we should fight the Cold War all over again. Embarking on a global competition with the Kremlin would not be a wise investment of U.S. prestige or resources. It would consign us to a pointless game of whack-a-mole against any and all manifestations of Russian influence. Putin’s Russia has little of the hard power or ideological appeal that made the Soviet Union so influential in various parts of the world.

Moreover, today’s circumstances are vastly different from the Soviet threat. Europe is not the devastated wasteland it was after World War II. NATO has welcomed two new members, Finland and Sweden. Putin is reduced to knocking on doors in places like Beijing, Tehran and Pyongyang. The proverbial correlation of forces has tilted decidedly against Russia.

 

Most important, against all predictions, Ukraine has withstood the Russian onslaught. In less than two years the Ukrainian army has reduced an entire decade of Russian military modernization to dust. Keeping Ukraine in the fight and supplying it with weapons and ammunition, as President Biden pledged in a speech on Oct. 19, is not charity but the most urgent—and cost-effective—element of Western strategy.

No less crucial is helping Ukraine to navigate toward its rightful place in Europe. No post-Communist country in Europe has gone through what Ukraine is going through now. The country’s reconstruction will be a generational undertaking not just for its own people but for its many friends, partners, and allies.

Maintaining cohesion and resolve among the Western allies will be essential for leaders on both sides of the Atlantic. The Kremlin long ago mastered the art of driving wedges between the U.S. and its allies. Unfortunately, the prospect of Putin’s eventual departure from the scene is already sparking talk about a new strategic opening to Russia that could somehow lure Moscow away from China’s embrace.

But we should be extremely cautious about giving any new leadership in the Kremlin the benefit of the doubt. Former President Reagan needed a lot of convincing before he felt that Mikhail Gorbachev was different from his Soviet predecessors. That challenge is now vastly more difficult, given that whoever might replace Putin would have to end the war and engage with Kyiv in genuine, serious negotiations.

The U.S. and its allies need to be clear about the long-term nature of this undertaking. The war’s end, whenever that happens, is unlikely to quell the confrontation between Russia and the rest of Europe. Ukrainians and their friends rightfully want to see the rise of a prosperous, independent Ukraine that is secure and fully integrated into the political and economic life of the continent. Putin and his successors would see that as Russia’s ultimate defeat. They will do everything in their power to prevent it.

 

Eugene Rumer, a former national intelligence officer for Russia at the National Intelligence Council, is director of the Russia and Eurasia program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Andrew S. Weiss, who worked on Russian affairs in both the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations, is Carnegie’s vice president for studies.

[bainit]

https://archive.ph/svnxD

 

In the siege of the Ukrainian front of Avdiivka: “The Russians are more prepared for war and to die”

The air and artillery superiority of the invader puts the defenses of kyiv's troops in this city in the province of Donetsk to the limit.

[sadhu sequencer]

V enem samem napadu HIMARS sistema je ta teden življenje izgubilo 76 ruskih vojakov.

[MikeHunt]

zadnje novice o ukrajinski zmagi?

 

sami ukrajinci bodo zelenskemu odrezal glavo in ga obesil za pete sredi Kijeva, bomo vidl, ce bo prej uspel pobegniti s privat letalom do privat vile v Franciji.

 

Taka zelo Janukovic situacija se razpleta

 

 

 

LP

[VonGriffin]

MikeHunt reče pred 2 urama:

zadnje novice o ukrajinski zmagi?

 

sami ukrajinci bodo zelenskemu odrezal glavo in ga obesil za pete sredi Kijeva, bomo vidl, ce bo prej uspel pobegniti s privat letalom do privat vile v Franciji.

 

Taka zelo Janukovic situacija se razpleta

 

 

 

LP

 

padec Odese cakamo ze dve leti gopnik, Ocitno je v ruski vojski bolj navarno biti  general kot vojakj

[fauzić]

Zanimiv prispevek. Da vemo komu dovoljujemo, da bo branil Evropo. 

V nekem, sicer odličnem članku, sem pred kratkim prebral zelo zanimivo polemiko : kaj je točno bilo to kar je pacificiralo Nemce? Kateri od ukrepov po 2. svetovni vojni, je Nemce naredil za bogaboječi, humanizma poln narod? Berlin ni Nemčija, Berlin je postavantgardna ideja tega kar naj bi Nemčija bila. Kdo ali kaj so Nemci?

Danes zgodovina več ne govori o "zavedenem nemškem narodu", ki je padel pod Hitlerjevo retoriko ampak o nečem drugem. Zanimivo kako hitro Evropa pozablja. 

Pozabila je Rusijo, sedaj pozablja Nemčijo. 

 

 

18. november 2023 uredilo bitje fauzo

[VonGriffin]

Saj zobe bi si lahko dal porihtat

[bainit]

crossdressam iz gnojčka

 

  

bainit reče pred 1 uro:

 

[bainit]